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Abstract
The paper offers a critical analysis of the central concept around which the popular construct of social
capital is organised, i.e. trust. To this end the views of Fukuyama, the leading exponent of the said concept
are considered. As a result, the concept in question is found to be ideologically charged and substantively
weak in many respects.
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1. Introduction
Whilst it is true that there are a number of various definitions of social capital, it is fair to
say that the  core meaning of the notion is that of a  web of social  relationships in a
community based on trust. The latter is the subject of a study by Francis Fukuyama who –
as far as the social capital, and social science literature in general, is concerned – has done
most for popularising the notion (although trust is also emphasised by, inter alia, Putnam,
1995;  Brehm  and  Rahn, 1997).  Fukuyama’s  famous,  or  notorious,  if  you  will,  thesis
arose, it is important to remember, as a reflection of the collapse of ”real socialism”
1 in
Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the apparent triumph of twin free-market doctrines
of Reaganomics and Thatcherism undermining the postwar welfare state institutions. That
grandiose claim proclaimed the arrival of humankind at its final form of society: “liberal
democracy is the only legitimate ideology left in the world, an end of history in the
Marxist-Hegelian sense of History as a broad evolution of human societies towards a final
goal”  (Fukuyama, 1995:  3).  With  no  competing  macro-economic  systems  to  market
capitalism, and “with the competitive advantages of location or technological innovation
being rapidly diminished through globalization, Fukuyama seeks to explain the relative
success of national economies in terms of culture” (Field et al., 2000:16). Apparently in
keeping  with  his  anti-statist  bent,  Fukuyama  asserts  that  circumstances  conducive  to
success are found among communities “formed not on the basis of explicit rules and
regulation but out of a set of ethical habits and reciprocal moral obligations internalized
by each of the community’s members” (1995: 9).
A  comment  is  in  order  regarding  Fukuyama’s  treatment.  To  couch  trust  as  a  social
phenomenon in ethical terms is to overstate the incidence and relevance of the moral in
society, as, amongst other things, Luhmann (1979) implies in pointing out that to not trust
1 The origin of the term (lying in the official documents of that period) still do not make it less useful than
the label „communism”, which is irrevocably ideological and at best (mis)identifies what is regarded as a
political quality of the system in question, whereas the term „socialism” refers to its underlying ownership
structure. On the collapse of the former regime and its core attributes see Tittenbrun (1993, 2011).European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
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in its broadest sense would prevent an individual from rising in the morning. He calls this
type of trust “confidence” (Luhmann, 1988).
According  to  the  prophet  concerned,  “virtually  all  serious observers  understand  that
liberal political and economic institutions depend on a healthy and dynamic civil society
for their vitality” (Fukuyama, 1995: 4). “The field of social capital is thus elevated to
being the crucial factor, forging the only viable forms of economy and polity” (Field et
al., 2000:16). Fukuyama holds that ‘a nation’s prosperity and competitiveness hinge upon
a single, pervasive, cultural trait: the level of trust present in the society and this depends
on “the crucible of trust” - social capital’ (1995: 7, 33). He goes on to distinguish between
societies characterized by high trust or low trust and, consequently, between forms of
solidaristic organization which are “older, economically harmful or inefficient” and those
which are “wealth creating” (1995: 159). Trust is defined as ‘the expectation that arises
within a community of regular, honest, and co-operative behaviour, based on commonly
shared norms, on the part of other members of the community ... these communities do
not  require extensive  contractual  and  legal  regulation  of  their  relations  because  prior
moral consensus gives members of the group a basis for mutual trust’ (1995: 26). It is
instructive to learn how those notions match real-world situations. Now, examples of
high-trust societies for Fukuyama are Japan, Germany and the United States characterized
by the development of large-scale corporations out of family firms through the medium of
“rich and complex civil society” (1995: 130). Low-trust societies are those of China, Italy
and France, the first two characterized by the restriction of trust, and thus enterprise, to
the ‘family’; the latter by the destruction of a rich civil society by a centralizing state.
“The test criterion for distinguishing between high- and low-trust, and between inefficient
and  efficient,  forms  of  solidarity  is  in  each  case ‘economic  progress’,  necessarily
unanalysed as it is assumed to be the universal of human societies” (Field et al., 2000:17).
“Japan  is  hailed  as  the  contemporary  nation  with  the  most  appropriate  form  of
‘spontaneous sociability’.” (Fukuyama, 1995: 159) The social capital enthusiast argues
that in economic life, group co-ordination is necessary for one form of production, but
when technology and markets change, a different type of co-ordination with perhaps a
different set of group members becomes necessary. The bonds of social reciprocity that
facilitated production in the earlier time period become obstacles to production in the
later one ... social capital can be said to be obsolete and needs to be depreciated in the
country’s capital accounts (Fukuyama, 1999:18-19).
Within the post-Fordist mode of production, with its more flexible work organisation than
that pertaining to capitalism in its Fordist phase, “worker discretion becomes increasingly
central to the smooth running of production” and a new form of discipline is required, a
form which is internalized and self-maintaining. Trust between workers and managers,
with the shared  goal of efficient production, replaces the ‘rule book’.  With only one
economic and political system thought viable, Fukuyama is thus enabled to restrict his
conceptual field to fine-tuning heaven: the basic structures of – a certain self-image of –
the United States of America are taken as universal, with the only problems remaining
being  to  ensure  maximum  conformity  of  human  factors  to  this  inevitable  moral  and
economic  order”  (Field  et  al., 2000:17).  Thus, what  Fukuyama  envisages,  is    a  free-
market, unrestrained “capitalism seeking ‘friction-free economies’” (1995: 149) in which
“the primacy of profit is not questioned by a trusted and trusting workforce, dedicated to
the enterprise” (Field et al., 2000:17).
There are, though, many reasons for questioning Fukuyama’s historiography. Ahistoricity
of his thesis is self-evident, if he wrote in the present century, in the period of deep, notVol. 5 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2013
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only cyclical but structural, crisis of capitalism, above all its Anglo-Saxon variety
2, he
would have to eat his words. His notion of a frictionless economy and self-equilibrating
markets  is  a  rose-tainted  myth  that  has  been  crashed  by  the  recent  crisis.  Moreover,
contrary to his view, it is not trust, understood as a cultural phenomenon, that underpins
economic  relations,  but  the  reverse  is, true - trust  relationships  are  an  outgrowth  of
underlying  economic  relations.  Japan  and  Germany  are  examples  of  stakeholder
capitalism, while the US epitomises shareholder capitalism. It is rather odd on the part of
Fukuyama to lump together the US with the two former economies, and on the grounds
that are contradicted by another social capital scholar, Robert Putnam who made his name
on the thesis exactly opposite to Fukuyama’s premise - that of declining civil society.
More important, however, is the aforementioned direction of causation pointing to the
fundamental  role  of  economic,  above  all  ownership,  relations  in  conditioning  extra-
economic  phenomena.  The  following  account  is  sound,  only  that  the  author  fails  to
contextualise it - the web of inter-relationships underpinned by a multitude of mutual
ownership  stakes  within  Japan’s  groupings  termed  keiretsu,  or  similarly  close  ties
between German companies and banks make the best fit: “Social capital has mainly been
seen as contributing to economic performance by reducing inter-firm transaction costs,
that is, search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing and
enforcement costs. Lower search and information costs improve the efficiency of resource
allocation. Reduced costs for bargaining and decision making facilitate the coordination
of  diverse  activities  between  firms  and  enable  an  even  further  division  of  labour”
(Richardson, 1953;  1993).  “Diminishing  costs  of  policing  and  enforcement  free  up
resources to be used in more productive ways” (2002).  It is ownership relations that
account for competitive advantages enjoyed by stakeholder capitalism not only in the
inter-firm  relationships,  but  also  at  the  workplace.  The  German  system  of  co-
determination  coupled  with  generous  fringe  benefits  and  Japanese  system of  lifetime
employment grounded in a similar safety net both express in fact ownership of jobs on the
part of employees. This ownership underpinning also accounts for what Shimada (1988)
christened with a new term “human-ware” as distinct from hardware and software. He
meant  that  the  basic  reason  for  the  strong  competitiveness  of  Japanese  automobile
companies was the cooperative attitude of the workers. He quoted a Japanese worker as
saying: “In a US company, each worker is eager to make his individual success, and
unwilling to tell what he knows to his colleagues. But here, everybody is willing to tell
what he knows as much as possible to the colleagues. This is because he believes that he
can make a success only as a team, not on his own” (p. 61). The workers are co-operative
thanks to Japan’s (mutually dependent) employment system and labour power market. In
an economy where long-term employment is dominant, and thus one’s current job and job
prospects (due to a pre-established and clear path of promotion) it is worthwhile to work
for the success of the whole team. Because others have a similar attitude, there is created
a virtuous circle of self-reinforcing social pressure. Another result is the prevalence (at
least amongst this core employee class, as by no means all employees enjoy lifetime
employment)  of  company-specific  labour  power.  Rather  than  general  labour  power
typical of job-changers and job-seekers.
From another angle, “cooperative behaviour among firms is also thought to have aided
the  development  of  Japan’s  manufacturing  sector,  especially  in  the  consumer  durable
2 At the time of writing, when the problems of Euro zone seem to overshadow those of other regions of the
world, it is worth remembering where and how all this mess had begun. And with respect, neither Greece
nor Spain has enough clout to bring about anything like global financial and/or economic crisis. More in
(Tittenbrun (2011; 2013b).European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
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sector. In drafting a design of a new car, for example, Japanese car producers took full
account of the views of parts makers, as well as those of the retailers, and tried to find the
best match of cost reduction and consumer satisfaction. This was possible only based on
the mutual trust, which was strengthened by strategies such as cross holding of equities
and  temporary  exchanges  of  workers  between  firms.  Such  long-run  relationships  and
mutual trust were helpful in reducing informational costs, not only in designing a new
product but also in making contracts. It was often the case that contracts were just broad
agreements and specific conditions were discussed later on” (Omori, 2001:5).
No less important - which draws our attention on the other objective dimension of the
phenomenon under investigation - was the trustworthiness of “infrastructure, i.e. the low
defect  ratio,  punctuality  of  railways  and  postal  service,  reliability  of  electricity  and
telephone  networks”  (Omori, 2001:5)  Thus,  it  is  not  an  elusive  quality  called  social
capital, as Adler and Kwon (2002) would have it, that transforms individuals from self-
regarding and egoistic agents with little sense of obligation to others into members of a
community with shared interests, a common identity and a commitment to the common
good, because those characteristics indeed distinct from ones built-in in the free-market
capitalism flow from distinctive ownership relations pertaining to stakeholder capitalism.
The ownership peculiarities discussed above mean that the two systems concerned are
actually two distinct capitalist modes of economic activity, and, while they possess a clear
geographic connotation, this does not preclude their appearance in other regions of the
world. This does not validate, of course, Fukuyama’s ahistorical position who in another
work views social capital as “both disposable and infinitely renewable”, decreeing on that
basis that people must be left simply alone and social capital will be created, particularly
where people are making money. Social capital and capitalism have under this conception
something  of  a  mutually  beneficial,  reciprocal  relationship.  Accordingly,  the  role  of
market relations and capitalism is never questioned: they only cause good. For example,
“market exchange promotes habits of reciprocity that carry on from economic life into
moral  life”  (Fukuyama, 1999:  261).  Without  closer  examination  of  the  underlying
economic relations, the mere acknowledgement of their social efficacy, of course, is not
good enough, nay; it distorts the picture of relationships between the economy and the
non-economic sphere of society. In a similar vein, for the British industrial sociologist
Alan Fox trust does not develop out of thin air. Fox is of course not the only writer who
realizes the causative power of economic relations; to cite an example, “social capital is at
the same time in part accumulated as an unintended and even unanticipated consequence
of economic activity as people often spend more of their waking hours ‘bowling’ with
their  workplace  colleagues  than  with  their  family  and  friends.  Norms,  codes,  trust,
solidarity and other vital elements of social capital are built and reinforced when sharing a
common  goal  or  a  mutual  fate  even  in  the  most  hierarchical  economic  structures
imaginable, like the globally operating multidivisional corporation, and not just when
people mingle, organize and achieve with peers in their spare time” (Maskell, 2004).
Fox’s treatment is, though, more elaborate. While he concedes that trust may be thought
of in purely personal terms, he nevertheless focuses on what he terms “institutionalized
trust”. From his point of view, trust and distrust “are embodied in the rules, roles and
relations which some men impose on, or seek to get accepted by, others” (Fox, 1974: 67).
Rules include both formal and informal understandings, whilst relations are construed in
terms  of  interdependence,  communication,  supervision  and  authority.  Fox  is thus
concerned  not  with  personal  feelings  between  people  as  individuals,  but  with
relationships which are structured and institutionalized. In addition, he conceives of high-
and low-trust situations as dynamic, and usually self-reinforcing. “The essential feature of
all trust relations is - he writes in clearly dialectical terms - their reciprocal nature. TrustVol. 5 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2013
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tends  to  evoke  trust,  distrust  to  evoke  distrust”  (Fox, 1974:  66).  This  reciprocation,
according to Fox, can be measured along two dimensions: long-term to short-term, and –
in terms of Parsonian pattern variables – specific to diffuse. Accordingly, the point of
lowest  trust  is  characterized  by  short-term  specific  reciprocation,  while  the  point  of
highest trust by long-term and diffuse (Fox, 1974: 72). Fox insists that this typology can
be employed in the analysis of employment relations at different levels. Furthermore, the
sociologist concerned distinguishes between vertical and lateral trust. In this context he –
in contradistinction to the stylised ideology of social capital –draws attention to the fact
that these relations may be in conflict with each other, for example where high levels of
lateral trust take the form of workers’ solidarity in opposition to management. “High
vertical and low lateral trust comes with ideologies of competitive individualism, with
highly differentiated levels of individual reward. Fox’s view of employment relations is
one of inherent conflict” (Field et al., 2000:18); as a result he observes that “those who
enjoy high-trust relations both vertically and laterally are exceptionally favoured” (Fox,
1974: 79). Schuller et al. write that Fox’s focus is on industrial relations, but this does not
detract from the general relevance of his analytical framework to the discussion of social
capital. They rightly point out that “the focus on institutionalized relations challenges
those  analyses  which  rely  on  individual  level  data,  most  prominently  in  the  form  of
personal  responses  to  questions  about  trust.  He  reminds  us  of  the  need to  build  in
awareness of underlying structures of power and inequality as major factors in shaping
trust relations, foreshadowing the critiques of social capital offered by such commentators
as Edwards and Foley” (Field et al., 2000:1998). Nay, not sharing his radical conclusions,
even  some  prominent  social  capital  theorists  are  very  critical  as  regards  the  type  of
methodology on which social capital studies usually rely. For instance, no other than
Francis Fukuyama in person admits that a significant downside of the concept of social
capital is the lack of consensus on how to measure it. He reports on two main approaches:
counting groups and group memberships and using survey to collect data on trust and
civic engagement. Both methods are in his judgment inadequate and imprecise (1999).
Let us dwell on this issue of methodology in somewhat more detail. It is fair to say that,
abstracting from Fukuyama who has special interest in trust, its prominent place in the
social  capital  research  stems  from  its  role  in  another  leading  social  capital  theorist’s
framework.
The  reader’s  attention  may  be  drawn  on  the  methodological  aspect  to  the  foregoing
exposition. A commentator writes that: “under Coleman’s model, the contract between
individuals requires the trust that acts by individuals will be reciprocated at some time in
the future. Trust is usually ascertained from a question in a social survey such as the
World  Values  Survey  or  the  General  Social  Survey  in  the  USA.  Examples  include,
‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people?’ or ‘Do you think that most people would try to take
advantage of you if they had a chance or would they try to be fair?’. These questions may
be supported by additional questions that attempt to expose attitudes towards reciprocity
or fairness, such as ‘Would you say most of the time people try to be helpful or that they
are mostly looking out for themselves?’ ” (Cox, 1995). This methodology is indeed faulty
in that it yields, if any, a superficial and shallow knowledge about social life. The survey
designers are not aware that the said research technique is actually an experimental one,
that is to say, one of an uncontrolled experiment in which survey questions function as
stimuli inducing subjects to certain types of behaviour, in this case verbal behaviour, that
otherwise  in  all  probability  would  not  have  taken  place.  In  other  words,  particular
answers to a questionnaire’s question may well be an artefact whose coming into being
results  merely  from  an  experimental  situation.  To  put  it  in  still  other  terms,European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
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experimentally  elicited  opinions  may  have  a  widely  diverse  ontological  and
epistemological status. Some of them may express a respondent’s genuine stance, but in
most  cases  they  will  correspond,  if  any,  to  a  skin-deep,  epiphenomenal  layer  of
consciousness whose artificiality and superficiality mean that it does not bear on real
actions of a given individual, and those elements of consciousness or sub-consciousness,
if  you  will,  that  are  not  relevant  to  real-world  behaviours  do  not  matter  from  a
sociological point of view. For example, to use a favourite term of social capital scholars,
if a citizen duly pays his or her taxes, it – for all practical purposes – means that he / she
places trust in the US government. Individuals in general may not have a high opinion
about the trustworthiness of the government. But such opinions, beliefs, etc. that do not
come up as motives, stimuli, or other component of real-world actions are sociologically
irrelevant. On the other hand, in an example given by Paxton (1999: 89) exactly such a
non-epiphenomenal  notion  of  trust  seems  to  be  implied:  “when  a  potential  trustor  is
embedded in a group, he or she may assign the other members of that group a level of
trustworthiness that is higher than the trustworthiness accorded to the average person, due
to the presence of norms and sanctions against those who break trust”, provided that this
does not necessarily mean that a given individual holds his or her corresponding attitude
out of fear of group sanctions; all what is necessary is the presence of his or her behaviour
that attest to that trusting attitude. It is also to this action-relevant, socially efficacious
sense of trust that Paxton (1999:102) refers when accounting for “the recent rise of gated
communities and the increased use of private security guards. It could be that our trust in
one another impacts how we organize our lives and how we choose to spend our money
(or how much money we spend)”. Upon perusal of the social capital literature, a few
other examples of such an approach can be found, i.e. actions associated with a display of
confidence in others treated as an outcome of a norm of trust (Bullen and Onyx, 1998), as
well as reciprocal acts or exchanges seen as an outcome of a norm of reciprocity (Rose,
1998). However, this is not how social capital researchers generally approach the issue
under consideration. And the problem is further compounded due to usual sociological
procedures. Curiously enough, it is an adherent of the research perspective in question
who openly admits that “there are signs of statistical techniques being applied in ways
which are poorly matched to the quality and the robustness of the data. This is particularly
true where the data consists of comparative attitudinal surveys, for example on declared
levels of trust, using highly ambiguous terminology. Quantitative analyses which relate
these,  and  through  them  levels  of  social  capital,  to  general  measures  of  economic
performance, need very severe health warnings” (Schuller, 2000:17). Moreover, the same
author identifies a specific dimension to the aforementioned problem related to the nature
of what is investigated in such surveys: “There are some curious possibilities relating to
the impact of measurement. In the natural sciences, the impact of the observer on the
observed is taken for granted. Social capital may be an extreme example of this in the
social field. For where trust becomes the focus of attention, this may cause it to wither as
much as to flourish; some relationships, norms and networks are strongest when they are
not exposed to constant examination. On the other hand, it has been well argued that if we
are moving towards risk societies, and proactively managing risk rather than passively
coping with it, so we should be moving from the passive valuing of trust to its active
maintenance” (Schuller, 2000: 20).
Such a justification of the relevance of trust is in point of fact problematic, however. By
any means not all, including the present author (Tittenbrun, 2011) agree with such an
appraisal of the risk society notion, which is in fact an example of rather crude social
essentialism. One more  example of the notion in question is provided  by  Bourdieu’s
(1983:248) definition: “social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resourcesVol. 5 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2013
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which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition - or in other words, to membership
in a group”. Social capital requires more than just a network of ties, however. According
to the French sociologist, social capital also involves “transforming  contingent relations,
such as those of neighbourhood, the workplace, or even kinship, into relationships that are
at once necessary and elective, implying durable obligations subjectively felt (feelings of
gratitude, respect, friendship, etc.)” (1983: 249-50).
This  petty-bourgeois  or  petty-capitalist  ideology  is  nicely  expressed  in  the  following
contention:  “Leadership  positions  in  communities  are  tied  to  economic  roles  and
influence.  Some  areas  are  losing  the  economic  roles  that  supported  community
leadership. In these areas, persons who used to own or manage local enterprises become
branch managers, passing through the area on career ladders that will eventually take
them  to  a  corporate  headquarters.  As  a  result,  the  ability  to  create  social  capital  has
diminished. The threat can be acute in small areas because business organisations are
consolidating  in  fewer,  large  financial  and  technology centres.  Mergers  and  other
consolidations reduce the number of business leaders who can reach the top of their field
while putting down roots in their community” (Blair, Carroll, 2008).
Even  putting  aside  this  kind  of  caveat,  the  credibility  of  knowledge  provided  by
sociological surveys can be called into question. “Survey questions can be interpreted
differently by respondents in two time periods. If respondents relax their interpretation of
trust between 1975 and 1985, we could see a change in measured trust even if there was
no change in the actual level of trust over the 10-year period” (Paxton, 1999: 89). In
addition,  social  capital  studies  have  been  subject,  inter  alia,  to  the  following
methodological criticisms: 1. Social capital indicators lack clear definition Attempts to
measure social capital have been widely criticised because the defining concepts, such as
‘trust’ and ‘networks’,  are  vague  and  ambiguous.  It  is  consequently  unclear  which
determinants are being measured in social capital research. (Pope, 2003: 6). This lack of
definition is well rendered by the following witty account by Labonte (1999): “There is
‘something’ going on ‘out there’ in people’s day-to-day relationships that is an important
determinant of the quality of their lives, if not communities’ healthy’ functioning... it is
the ‘gluey stuff’ that binds individuals to groups, groups to organisations, citizens to
societies’. What exactly this ‘something’ is remains moot”. Lomas (1998) stresses that
“There  are  few  known  and  validated  ways  to  measure  such  things  as  community
competence, social cohesion, or a sense of worth at the level of the community”. Along
similar lines, Leeder and Dominello (1999) argue that “Champions of social capital have
several kilometres to travel before a definition emerges that will render it a practical
matter for policy development”.
Portes and Landolt (1996) have also argued that a distinction needs to be made between
the sources of social capital (network, etc.) and the resources or advantages that derive
from them. To illustrate this point, they put forward the case of “two tertiary students in
need of money for tuition. One has acquired the money from parents while the other has a
highly supportive social network that cannot meet the expense. Whilst both have stocks of
social capital which could be measured using an indicator, the social capital of these
individuals has resulted in different outcomes” (Portes and Landolt, 1996). Similarly, in
the case of inner city and ghetto areas in the US, anthropologists have demonstrated high
levels of what is regarded as social capital in some areas, with many people relying on
friendship and kin networks for survival, but at the same time “the assets obtainable
through  these  networks  are  not  enough  to  remove  people  from  poverty“ (Stack and
Fernandez-Kelly in Portes and Landolt, 1996). It is apparent that the definition of socialEuropean Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
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capital is critical to an understanding of what is being measured and how social processes
lead to the acquisition of resources.
First and foremost, collective social capital has to be distinguished is from individual
social capital, whatever it might mean. A related criticism of social capital research is that
it confuses its unit of measurement (by the same token falling prey to an old antinomy
between micro- and macrostructures) by “aggregating information about individual social
capital (such answers from social surveys) to a measure that claims to represent a broader
collective unit” (Portes and Landolt, 1996).
This conflation of analytical levels results, in the final analysis, from a concentration on a
microstructual approach discussed above which makes it difficult smoothly to pass onto a
higher level. Thus, Portes and  Landolt (1996)  criticise Putnam for making individual
social capital, the property of groups or even nations. They argue that “collective social
capital... cannot simply be the sum of individual social capital”. This is the case because
“the sources and benefits of social capital available at the individual network level (‘the
gluey stuff that binds individuals to groups) may be very different from those available at
the social level of institutions and governments (‘the gluey stuff’ that binds citizens to
institutions)” (Portes and Landolt, 1996). To illustrate, a researcher is likely to arrive at
very  different  findings  regarding  trust  in  the  case  of  Coleman’s  network  of  Jewish
diamond traders if they are asked “about the network through which they are deriving
their social capital, or society” (Pope, 2004:7) at large. Moreover, it is likely that the
process  of  aggregation  would  be  not  very  helpful,  as  the  pieces  of  knowledge  to  be
aggregated are so heterogeneous.
Coming back to Fox, one reason for which his approach merits attention is the emphasis
on the dynamics of the relationships under investigation. In particular, “it should help us
avoid reliance on static cross-sectional approaches which purport to measure stocks of
social  capital  without  accompanying  these  with  a  sense  of  trajectory.  The  temporal
dimension is essential” (Schuller et al., 2000:18). Indeed, just as in the case of other
similar dilemmas, if one ever thins seriously about developing a  scientifically acceptable
conception of social capital, it must encompass both inextricably interwoven aspects of
social reality: static and dynamic one, or, in other terms, structure and agency.
In turn, Fox’s lateral-vertical matrix addresses exactly the issues raised by the debate
among  social  capital  scholars  over  whether  social  capital  inheres  in  horizontal
associations, or is to be found also in hierarchical relationships. Lastly, for their anti-
individualistic,  structuralist  perspective,  it  is  worth  citing  Fox’s concluding  remarks
regarding  “a  perceived  lack  of  commitment  to  the  exercise  of  discretion  in  work
organizations:  Lack  of  ambition,  fear  of  responsibility,  and  the  absence  of  talent  are
usually offered as possible reasons but these beg questions rather than answer them”
(Fox, 1974:364).  Note  his  first-rate  sociological  explanation:  “Within  a    society  […]
where  ambition  is  apt  to  be  an  individualistic  thrust  towards  personal  achievement,
recognition,  and  success,  there  need  be  no  surprise  that  many  fail  to clear  these
definitional and practical hurdles, especially when to them is added the inequalities of life
chances which so patently inhibit or frustrate aspirations”  (Fox, 1974:364). At the same
time Fox goes beyond diagnosis: “Social structures and work arrangements are, however,
theoretically conceivable which would invite and promote high-discretion contributions
in a setting where no premium was placed on individualistic ambition and self-assertion;
where men ready to offer their involvement, judgement and discretion were not deterred
from doing so by the prospect of being drawn out to a fine point of ‘success’ or ‘failure’”.
(Fox, 1974: 365). Recall, too, that Fox dispenses with the concept of social capital, andVol. 5 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2013
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his  views  have  been  considered  for  their  opposition  to  the  mainstream  social  capital
literature. Whilst in the work of Fox ‘trust’ is seen as a key attribute of the workplace, in
that of Fukuyama it pertains to the whole civil society. Fox’s knowledge of work relations
permits him to view trust not as a personal attribute but as a structural characteristic.
“Fukuyama, with only one socioeconomic system possible, offers a straightforward, and
tautological, functionalism: differentials of power, status and reward are those ‘necessary’
for  the  system,  and  trust  is  the  mechanism  by  which  such  unequal  individuals  unite
around the shared objective of economic progress. For Fox, such inequalities militate
against trust. This contrast foreshadows something of the contemporary debates about
whether social capital is an essentially conservative notion built around an assumption of
consensus and social unity” (Schuller et al., 2000: 18).
Note again an analogy between the literature under examination and sociology in general,
wherein  an  almost  identical  debate  focused  on  the  work  of  Parsons  and  structural
functionalism  in  general.  Anyway,  this  point  allows  us  to  turn  to  the  topic  of  the
subsequent section.
2. Social Capital and Ideology
The inevitable association of social capital with once influential F. Schumacher’s motto
(1974) “Small is beautiful” makes the concept a convenient conduit for promotion of
localism,  family  and  other  conservative  values.  No  wonder  that  these  values  are
prominent in David Cameron’s political agenda for the Big Society, as opposed to Big
Government. And, incidentally, the British politician makes explicit use of the concept
under consideration in the context of his visionpointing out that “the process of getting
there builds social capital. Neighbours who have no reason to know each other will need
to  convene  and  collaborate  in  order  to  get  a  new  school  or  better  policing” (The
Economist 2010). Just as according to free market fundamentalists the state should refrain
from any intervention in the market process, a representative advocate of social capital
“suggests one of the most important issues is the effect that government has on social
capital, and warns of some of the damaging effects of government on social capital”
(Norton, 1998). Similarly, the former Australian Treasurer, Peter Costello, had used the
concept of social capital to call for a more limited role of government and a revival of the
‘spirit of the volunteer’. Costello called on Australians to spend one hour of their week on
volunteer  activity  (Costello, 2001).  This is  all  very  well  until  one  asks  how public
libraries would run by unqualified amateurs fare. Hodgkin is therefore right in calling
attention to the “danger in this [which] is that responsibility for welfare provision shifts to
a vaguely defined concept of ‘community’” (2009). Social capital can thus render useful
services to the curious blend of neo-liberal conservatism adopted by most Anglo-Saxon
governments promoting the shrinking of the state which is, after all, so beneficial for
public finances in the present allegedly inevitable age of universal austerity. Social capital
ideology  fosters  cuts  in  the  welfare  state  whose  functions  are,  after  all,  much  more
efficiently and effectively realised at a local level. It is thus held that “social capital can
help to mitigate the insidious effects of socioeconomic disadvantage (Putnam, 2000:319-
325). By the same token social capital and its advocates play a useful role of defending
the underpinnings of the system that begets those underprivileged who should refrain
from any action levelled against the former since their needs will be catered for by theEuropean Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
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fabric of social capital. Social capital thus serves to domesticate the disadvantaged masses
deadening the edge of social protest. This nicely fits in the more general defence of status
quo  whose  one  manifestation  may  be  the  following  claim:  “Changes  in  the  external
environment can also break the bonds necessary for effective capital. Concern has been
expressed that economic change can destroy community cohesion” (Blair, Carroll, 2008).
It is no accident, therefore, that „politicians such as Bill Clinton, George Bush, Tony
Blair, and Bertie Ahern have all found merit in social capital to pedal their own agendas”
(Shah, 2004).
Meanwhile,  communitarians  and  other advocates  of  social  capital  tend  to  ignore
uncomfortable facts about their idol. The social capital project described in what follows
appears unreservedly benign: “The goals of Healthy Boston were as follows: (1) create
vehicles for collective community voice and action, that is, coalitions; (2) serve as a
catalyst to increase collaboration to improve services and optimize resources; (3) create a
new kind of partnership between the community and city government; (4) embrace a set
of  values:  encourage  work that  is  community-based  and  empowering, collaborative,
multicultural, and inclusive” (Miller, 1997: 159). There is the other side of that coin,
however.  “Coalitions”  may  easily  become  what  Olson  terms  “distributive  coalitions”
engaged in rent-seeking, and “collaboration” may well hide corruption and nepotism. In
the literature under investigation, an anti-statist ideology is matched, at the theoretico-
methodological  level  by  an  interactionist  (face-to-face),  anti-macrostructural  focus
3,
which, needless to say, contributes to the neglect of macrostructural economic policies
that strongly influence levels of social capital in a particular community, due to which
“intervening  in  communities  to  increase  their  levels  of  social  capital  may  be  as
ineffective,  or  as  damaging,  as  intervening  to  encourage  individuals  to  change  their
lifestyles.  Usually  such  an  approach  doesn’t  work,  creates  resentment,  overloads
community resources, and ‘blames the victim’. Thus, as Lynch et al have noted, ‘there
has  been  an  idle  discussion  […]  focusing  on  what  materially  and  politically
disenfranchised  communities  can  do  for  themselves  [which]  may  be  akin  to  victim
blaming at the community level’ ”(Pearce, Smith, 2003).
Symptomatically enough,   the general philosophy mentioned above must often be toned
down when it comes to the nuts and bolts of social capital. It is pointed out, for instance,
that “most of the production and ‘consumption’ benefits of social capital can be captured
even  by  persons  who  do  not  contribute  to  its  development or  who  do  not  share  the
attitudes  that  measure  the  presence  of  social  capital.  Therefore  social  capital  has
important public goods characteristics. As in the case of most public goods, economists
recognise  the  need  for  public  intervention  to  achieve  optimal  levels  of  output.
Governments exert indirect as well as direct influence on the creation of social capital as
they pursue other goals such as police protection and land use plans. The CONCISE
project  reported  empirical  evidence  on  the  importance  of  the  social  economy  in
generating social capital. Support for local social institutions in the process of economic
development practice may strengthen local social capital” (Blair, Carroll, 2008).
The issue of social capital vis-a-vis the state is also taken up by the following pair of
commentators, who point up that, in keeping with our earlier comments, “move towards
local ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ has produced, albeit with very different agendas,
3 This is why social capital , paradoxically, is not fully but only partly social, or, more precisely “sociable”,
as  it  encompasses  just  face-to-face  relationships,  whereas  in  actual  fact  it  is  the  other  category-of
intermediate social relations that dominates quantitatively and qualitatively the social life of any society,
globalised or not . For some social capital theorists, even this microstructural focus is too general so that
they step lower down to “the nano-exchanges such as a smile, nod, or pleasant word” (Blair, Carroll 2008).Vol. 5 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2013
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a high level of agreement between actors and institutions of the ‘new’ Left and the ‘new’
Right” (Mohan and Stokke, 2000).  The aforementioned critics go on to argue that “It is
not difficult to see why the concept of social capital has become so central to recent
debates in development. It is essentially the sociocultural ‘glue’ which binds communities
together  and  ensures  both  political  and  economic  progress.  This  represents  a  highly
reductionist approach to political economy where local communities are presented in a
non-threatening language of trust, networks, reciprocity and associations. More conflict-
orientated notions of power, class, gender and ethnicity are relatively unheard within the
discourse on social capital. This allows a diverse range of interests to communicate. The
recent popularity of the concept of social capital must also be seen in the light of the
retreat of fundamentalist neo-liberalism to what we have referred to as ‘revisionist neo-
liberalism’.  In  its  earliest  incarnation  neo-liberalism  sought  to  remove  the  state  from
economic life and liberate market forces and the entrepreneurial spirit. After 15 years of
largely unsuccessful adjustment and liberalisation, the architects of neo-liberalism began
to soften and conceded, first, a more positive role for the state and, second, an awareness
that development is a social process whose cultural underpinnings need to be understood.
It is in this latter arena that social capital (and much of the rational choice institutionalism
[...]) needs to be placed. The combined effect of these two changes has seen the move
towards multiple stakeholder approaches to development involving partnerships between
state,  private  capital  and  civil  society.  […]  One  obvious  problem  is  the  tendency  to
essentialise  and  romanticise ‘the  local’.  This  means  that  local  social  inequalities  and
power relations are downplayed. Another problem is the tendency to view ‘the local’ in
isolation from broader economic and political structures. (This point is entirely in line
with our own diagnosis in the body of the paper). This means that the contextuality of
place,  e.g.  national  and  translational  economic  and  political  forces,  is  underplayed”
(Mohan, Stokey 2000).
The foregoing is also related to a further point made by Hodgkin who notes: “More
recently, academics have raised concerns that the social capital literature is too gender
neutral (Lowndes, 2000; Norris and Inglehart, 2003; Sapiro, 2003), seemingly ignoring
differences in the day-to-day experiences of men and women (Sapiro, 2003). Previously,
when gender was discussed in the social capital literature, the focus has been to examine
women and their causal effect on stocks of social capital. Women and the centrality of
their role in fostering social capital is implicit in the social capital lost thesis, linking the
decline of social capital to the increasing workforce participation of women” (Hodgkin,
2009). And this debate over the role of women in the social capital literature speaks
volumes about its ideological and thus cognitive bias.
As Lowndes (2004) so aptly notes, the focus has been on considering whether women are
either the ‘saviours’ or ‘wreckers’ of social capital. Lowndes (2004) argues that women
have been cast in the role of ‘saviour’ of social capital, participating in networks built
around children. “Alternatively, they have been cast in the role of ‘wrecker’ of social
capital, no longer selfless, placing their own needs above those of their children. This is
evidenced in women’s increased workforce participation. Such approaches can be found
in the work of Coleman (1988) and Putman (2000) who both argue for the ‘social capital
lost’ thesis and the role that increased female workforce participation contributes to it. For
instance, Coleman (1988) set out to investigate perceived loss of stocks of social capital.
In Coleman’s focus on the family, he argues that the more women worked, the more they
lost  crucial  associations  for  their  families  and  ultimately  with  their  immediate
communities. […] Both Putnam’s and Coleman’s theorising of social capital present usEuropean Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
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with a normative
4 understanding of the nuclear  family, with a male breadwinner and
female ‘homemaker’”  (Edwards, 2004;  Molyneux, 2002).  Meanwhile,  this  traditional
model cannot  be  taken  for  granted by  no  means;  on  the  contrary,  at  least  in  some
advanced societies, it becomes increasingly outdated-in today’s US society, for example,
women make up four breadwinners out of each ten families.
It is also the aforementioned commentator who takes issue with the treatment outlined
above: “This uncritical approach, and its increased use in social policy, signals increasing
disadvantage  for  women.  Promoters  of  social  capital  ignore  a  substantial  body  of
literature devoted to gender and class inequality. This literature alerts us to power and
labour imbalances in the family” (Molyneux, 2002). Given these apposite criticisms, it is
surprising that their author herself adopts the jargon which obfuscates rather than clarifies
the phenomena under consideration. The reader may be forgiven for wondering what the
following conclusion from her research might mean: “Access to bonding social capital
was compromised by work hours”. Meanwhile, it simply means that working women do
find it difficult to reconcile their jobs with family commitments, in particular rearing
children. The preceding clearly shows how misplaced is the following characterisation of
social capital “as a blend of socialism and liberalism” (Schuller, 2011). Liberalism, or
more precisely, neo-liberalism, yes, but socialism? The kind of values espoused by the
theory of social capital indeed revolves around cosiness, or to use an apposite German
word, Gemütlichkeit. But why should it be associated with socialism in the first place? If
anything, socialism had been always indicted of neglecting familiar and other such merits
and virtues. Needless to say, one cares about the pressure of ideology on social capital
deliberations not only for its own sake, that is, for the purpose of establishing the fact of
such presence, but because of its consequences. When research is used to illustrate some
ideological point, the former must suffer. And this is noted by some commentators, Shah,
for example, writes about his colleague as follows: “For Muntaner, the bottom line is
whether social capital brings new ideas and findings; he argues for less ideology and
more-specific models integrating social structure and psychosocial exposures into better
understanding of the determinants of morbidity and mortality” (2011). The Panglossian
Concept.  “Worse  problem  is  that  existing  measurements  of  social  capital  sometimes
appear to reduce well-being or engender distress” (Haines et al. 2002; Herrero and Gracia
2007). Such an apparent downside of social capital is inconsistent with the view that
capital typically generates resources for the benefit of its owner (Coleman, 1988; Krishna
and Uphoff, 2002). The theoretical literature, on the whole, describes social capital as a
social good, a concept that promotes well-being: people are happier if they ultimately feel
they belong to a community and that they are connected in various ways (McMichael and
Manderson, 2004).  There  are  some  interesting  differences  in  that  regard  between
Coleman  and  Bourdieu.  Coleman,  as  distinct  from  Bourdieu  recognises  the  value  of
connections for all actors, individual and collective, privileged and disadvantaged. “But
Coleman’s  view  is  also  naively  optimistic;  as  a  public  good,  social  capital  is  almost
entirely benign in its functions, providing for a set of norms and sanctions that allow
individuals  to  co-operate  for  mutual  advantage  and  with  little  or  no ‘dark  side’.
Bourdieu’s usage of the concept, by contrast, virtually allows only for a dark side for the
oppressed, and a bright side for the privileged” (Field 2003: 28). It is fairly obvious where
the greatest sin of both frameworks lie in their lack of a dialectic approach. Some studies
4 An  extent  to  which  the  notion  under  consideration  is  ideologically  charged  may  be  gauged  from an
alternative opinion which sees a positive “effect of the success of social capital as a concept in attracting
interest  in  a  wide  range  of  disciplines  and  policy  sectors”  in  the  “reintroduction  of  normative  issues
explicitly into the debate” (Schuller, 2011).Vol. 5 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2013
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of social capital in the context of virtual learning communities reveals many desirable
qualities such as trust, honesty, co-operation, the keeping of commitments, and networks
of strong personal relationships that most members of society would obviously deem
valuable in the communities they are involved in. However several authors have realised
(which, honestly speaking, is no brainer) that just as these virtues can be used to draw
people in to their membership, they can also be used to keep others out. Daniel, Schwier
and McCalla (2003) point out that Communities that exhibit highly cohesive forms of
social  capital  are  thus  not  necessarily  beneficial  to  the  overall  society.  Cohesive
communities that manifest strong social capital may exclude others from entering into the
communities, and this can lead to abuses that harm the community (p. 8). These authors
go on to say, “these groups might encourage internal trust among their members while
spreading  hate  and  terror  to  the  larger  society.  Such  is  the  case  with  the  terrorist
organisations and organised crime groups” (2003: 8). At certain times or in particular
societies there may be certain forms of antagonistic social capital. Some authors defend
the idea that social capital has a negative effect on a society. The excessive religious
fervour with which certain countries conduct their societies may contribute to wars or to
the onset of other kinds of conflicts and belonging to such a group would, of course, have
negative effects. Fukuyama (1999) states that, ‘‘Both the Ku Klux Klan and the Mafia
achieve co-operative ends on the basis of shared norms, and therefore have social capital,
but they also produce abundant negative externalities for the larger society in which they
are embedded. (Neira et al., 2009: 118). Stephanie Frith reported for CNEWS that gangs
were using the Web to recruit and plan crimes (2001). This is obviously an extreme
example of the misuse of social capital, but it is important to examine the impetus behind
the community. Kosonen (2004, 3) similarly notes that “maximizing social capital may
lead  to  negative  consequences  such  as  exclusion  of  outsiders  and  restrictions  on
individual freedoms”. There can also be a significant downside. Groups and organizations
with high social capital have the means (and sometimes the motive) to work to exclude
and subordinate others. Furthermore, the experience of living in close knit communities
can be stultifying - especially to those who feel they are ‘different’ in some important
way. […] the scale of local surveillance that can be involved, the possible impacts around
what is deemed acceptable behaviour, and the ways in which horizons may be narrowed
rather than expanded are not unambiguously ‘good things’ (Smith, 2000). Whilst there are
a few researchers who take account of the reverse side of the coin, as manifested in terms
such as “perverse social capital” (Rubio 1997; Portes and Landolt, 2000), or antisocial
capital (Daanish, 2005), this is far from adequate as an approach boiling down to an
alternative:  on  the  one  side,  on  the  other  side  amounts  to  what  Hegel  referred  to
scornfully as an Anglo-Saxon dialectics. In general, dialectics is striking by its absence in
social  capital  theory.  The  core  dialectical  concept  is  contradiction  whereby  one
phenomenon has opposite effects. Thus, “the monitoring which takes place in certain
local  communities,  and  which  results  in abiding and  forced  solidarity,  has  a  positive
function of social control. However, it may also have a negative effect on the individual
insofar as it limits freedom of action”. In this connection, Boissevain reports on a village
community on Malta, where neighbours know everything about everyone, and where the
demand for participation in joint activities ultimately leads to a demand for conformity.
The  curtailed  freedom  of  action  which  follows  from  this  goes  a  long  way  toward
explaining  “why  the  young  and  the  more  independent-minded  have  always  left”
(Boissevain in Portes, 1998:16). The social capital networks can also take on a direct
exclusionist and negative character. Beyond monopolisation, this may also lead to a group
more or less consciously isolating itself from its surroundings. A case in point refer to the
Puerto Rican drug dealers in New York, who do everything to keep each other within theEuropean Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
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drug milieu, such that it becomes treason to mix with the whites in an attempt at social
upward mobility (Portes, 1998:17). Bertram Bruce notes that “even the basic computer
interface  becomes  a site  for  the  maintenance  of  power,  favouring  professional  over
working class users, English speakers over non-English, men over women, white over
black, and other all-too-familiar hierarchies” (2004: 4). The polarisation of employment is
one of the great threats to social cohesion. The contrast between work-rich and work-poor
households  has  developed  alarmingly  over  the  last  two  decades.  One  of  the  seminal
findings of Coleman’s work (Coleman 1988) was the way in which families with high
human capital and high net earnings may nevertheless be low in social capital because
there is little time for social interaction within the family and between the family and
other social institutions. This is also a major conclusion of Putnam’s recent work (2000).
These findings place the issue of the distribution of working time at the heart of the policy
agenda” (Schuller, 2011).  Andrew  Calcutt,  author  of  the  book  White  Noise,  writes,
“cyber-communitarians are enthusiastic about the new forms of conversation facilitated
by digital communications. But the new community is perhaps more remarkable for what
it excludes than for what is included in it” (1999: 22). Similar to Bruce, Ziauddin Sardar,
co-editor of a special edition of Futures journal entitled “Cyberspace: To Boldly Go”,
claims the following: In a cyberspace community you can shut people off at the click of a
mouse and go elsewhere. One therefore has no responsibility of any kind... But virtual
communities serve another purpose; they protect us from the race and gender mix of real
community,  from  the  contamination  of  pluralism.  (1995:  787-8)  Calcutt (1999:  23)
expands on this exclusive club mentality when he states, “virtual communities also define
themselves according to who is excluded... The online community is essentially a club
which represents a retreat from the street”. Being virtual is often enough to keep those out
who will not know the url or who will not be able to navigate the site. Even simple
mechanisms such as the interface at the reception area and the language used is artificially
exclusive, with no greater purpose than to set up walls around the members and to keep
out those who are unfamiliar with the inner workings of the group. Some of the criticisms
levelled at the one-sided, short-sighted character of the social capital concept, however,
only  lead  to  further  misunderstandings. Complains  that  “women  do  not  get  enough
acknowledgements for their contributions to social capital” are made every day on an
informal basis. Women’s construction as natural carers renders some of the unpaid work
they do in the community invisible” (Hodgkin, 2009), there can be, of course, no question
that gender equality is desirable. What is questionable in the above case for it, is its
underpinning by the notion of non-market work done by women. On socio-economic
grounds,  there  is  a  clear  distinction  between  the  activities  that  yield  the  means  of
subsistence, and the remaining ones which, however socially and ethically valuable they
may be, are not. And for moral or any other reasons it is not wise to obliterate the said
distinction  and  to  extend  the  concept  of  labour  beyond  its  justified  bounds.  Existing
measurements  of  social  capital  sometimes  appear  to  reduce  well-being  or  engender
distress (Haines et al., 2002; Herrero and Gracia, 2007). “Such an apparent downside of
social capital is inconsistent with the view that capital typically generates resources for
the benefit of its owner (Coleman, 1988; Krishna and Uphoff, 2002). This inconsistency
is  likely  to  reside  in  the problematic  measurement  of  social  capital” (Cheung,  Chen,
2010). Strong  ties  can  also  be  dysfunctional,  excluding  information  and  reducing  the
capacity  for  innovation  (Granovetter, 1973).  There  can  be  negative  normative
associations as well as positive ones - so that some networks embody the ‘dark side’ of
social capital, to the detriment of the wider society and even of its own members. […]
Field  and  Spence  (2000)  show  that  in  Northern  Ireland  the  values  of  tight-knit
communities can serve to inhibit the learning aspirations of adults, binding them into aVol. 5 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2013
22
low-skill  local  economy  and  reinforcing  the  divide  between  those  who  achieve  high
qualifications in the initial educational phase and those who do not. On the other hand,
where there is low trust and poor communication between employers and the local labour
force, an exclusive policy focus on increasing skills and qualifications will do little to
reverse spirals of decline or attack social exclusion. Employers need to value and reward
human capital in ways which communicate this to society as a whole, and not only to the
most  readily  employable.  In  other  words,  a  social-capital-based  analysis  of  local  or
regional conditions may reveal the weakness of supply-focussed policies and point to the
need for wider, more integrated and multi-levelled policy action (Maskell et al., 1998;
Schuller, 2011).
3. Conclusion
The  preceding  should  not  be  read  as  a  denial  of  an  important  place  of  trust  in  both
economy and society. Yet, to acknowledge this fact is not the same as to concur with
wrapping up the said relations in the social capital phraseology. Whilst it is arguable that
the presence of value-charged concepts is in the social sciences inevitable, this might
seem to imply that this is just a matter of one’s individual judgment - what for X is
acceptable, for Y is not. But the matter is not that simple; as shown above, in the case of
social capital, a particular ideology combines with some substantive assumptions and
claims of negative cognitive value. The notion of trust, commonly regarded as a core of
social  capital  leads  to  its  culturalist  interpretation  whereby  its  real  socio-economic
underlying substratum is ignored, or at best downplayed. Be that as it may, the concept of
social capital is not in a position to play a role of effective policy tool assigned to it.
Given,  as  demonstrated  elsewhere  (Tittenbrun, 2013a)  logical  and  other  flaws  to  the
concept of social capital, it should be discarded, which however, given its ideological
usefulness mentioned above, is, unfortunately, rather unlikely.
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